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Section 1. Introduction
A major problem encountered in building automatic problem-
solving systems is the necessity of providing controls on program
reasoning and action. When faced with this problem, however, some
researchers have divided reasoning into the categories of antecedent
(data-directed) and consequent (goal-directed) reasoning. They then
claim that the problem of control is just that of deciding on a proper
balance between antecedent and consequent representations of program
knowledge. In contrast to this, we argue that the dichotomy of
reasoning into antecedent and consequent reasoning is misleading, and
is due to an inadequate understanding of the nature of control of
reasoning. Consequent reasoning is only one method among many
available for the control of program actions. In this paper, we
indicate how dependency relationships between facts may be used to
-effect various controls on reasoning, including consequent reasoning,
in an antecedent reasoning framework. This embedding allows the
processes controlling program reasoning to enjoy the many advantages of
antecedent reasoning.
The Basic Reasontng Process
The basic reasoning process available to programs is a
generative one, in which current knowledge is used to deduce or create
additional knowledge. This type of reasoning process is best captured
by antecedent, event-triggered reasoning, since antecedent-driven
processes enjoy the important qualities of being non-chronological and
additive. Since antecedent processes are non-chronological in nature,
they provide a. knowledge representation free of many problems of
interactions induced by time-dependence of computations. A concomitant
benefit of antecedent reasoning is that it makes the reasoning involved
in dependencies between facts clear and easily recorded; the
dependencies are derived from the logical dependencies between facts,
and are not dependent upon spurious chronological accidents. That is,
the reasons for the program's knowledge about a fact consist only of
the facts used in its derivation, and not on the particular
chronological history of the program's actions. (This quality of
event-triggered or event-enabled reasoning is also attractive from the
viewpoint of Dijkstra [1976], whose guarded commands are essentially
event-enabled processes.) An important consequence of the non-
chronological nature of antecedent reasoning is additivity. As the
order of program actions is not critical, so the time and order in
which new rules become known is not particularly critical either. This
additivity allows a distributed style of computation in which missing
knowledge does not necessarily cause program failure, but merely
limited program capabilities.
The major limitation on the use of the basic antecedent
reasoning process is that it must be controlled. Effectiveness and
efficiency demand that there be mechanisms for focusing and directing
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the actions taken by the program, since in infinite domains (domains in
which infinitely many facts are derivable), and in finite domains with
more answers than interesting questions, the vast majority of program
actions and deductions are irrelevant to solving the problems of
interest and should be avoided. This is the genesis of the problem of
control of reasoning, as in standard axiomatizations of most domains
the combinatorial nature of the method of combining small actions and
deductions into a solution necessarily dominates the considerations of
the designers of problem-solving programs. Even though the range of
program actions may be limited by employing self-limiting
representations or axiomatizations for the components of knowledge of
the domain (such as are employed in Nevins' [1974] geometry theorem
prover and in Minsky's [19743 theory of Frames), the domain may still
be large enough so that direction is needed in the slot-filling
process.
Controls on Reasontag
Many methods have been devised for controlling program actions.
The most fundamental method is that of explicitly programming the logic
of the solution construction process. For *instance, one form this
method assumes is the programming of the process as a decision tree, in
which all possible cases must be considered. This method has long been
known to suffer by being highly inflexible when extensions and
modifications to the program are required.
A number of control strategies have been developed in the
context of resolution theorem proving [Robinson 1965] (see Chang and
Lee [1973] for examples), but in general these have proved inadequate;
apparently these strategies are more directed towards reducing the
effort involved in generating and testing a proposed solution, rather
than aiding in reducing the effort involved in searching the space of
problem solutions. That is, these strategies are primarily
optimizations of theorem prover operations which are independent of
domain, and provide little or no help in introducing domain-dependent
control mechanisms [de Kleer 1976a].
Another strategy for controlling reasoning is that of
consequent reasoning, the strategy of reasoning from goals to known
facts. (In a theorem-proving context, the use of consequent reasoning
is usually called the set-of-support strategy.) Consequent reasoning
is a very common method of controlling search, as it is a simple
mechanism for enforcing a certain form of relevance in actions toward
deciding the current questions by only using rules of inference or
action which mention a current goal in their conclusion. It is
important to note, however, that anything deducible via consequent
reasoning is also deducible by antecedent reasoning - that is,
consequent reasoning is just a particular way of controlling antecedent
reasoning. (Indeed, Nevins' [1974] geometry theorem prover's use of
consequent reasoning is essentially identical to its use of antecedent
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reasoning, and, as de Kleer [1976a] observes, could apparently be made
superfluous by a slight modification to the main control loop of the
program. See [Moore 1975] for additional discussions of these issues.)
Backtracking is another method of controlling reasoning.
Backtracking allows the focusing of program attention on just one set
of possibilities at a time, considering other sets of possibilities
only if the first set of choices leads to failure. Automatic
backtracking mechanisms have fallen into disfavor since the advent of
MICRO-PLANNER, in which chronological, side-effect-free automatic
backtracking was made an virtually unavoidable program control
mechanism. This form of automatic backtracking has many problems
associated with it. (See [Sussman and McDermott 1972) for a discussion
of these problems.) Many of the unpleasant features of automatic
backtracking are remedied, however, by the use of a non-chronological,
dependency-directed backtracking system [Stallman and Sussman 1976].
Other methods for controlling reasoning include the use of meta
rules, protocols, and task networks. Meta rules [Davis 1976] provide a
mechanism for controlling program actions at times when more than one
action is known to be feasible. Meta rules have the feature of being
useful at many levels: in controlling the basic program actions (first
level use), in selecting which strategy to use (second level use), in
deciding how to select a strategy (third level use), etc. The use of
specialized protocols finds related applications in guiding program
actions. Examples of protocols are the choice and rephrasing protocols
of NASL (McDermott 1976], the NOAH plan refinement loop [Sacerdoti
1975], the SIMPLE ATN [Goldstein and Miller 1976], and Nevins'
partitioned deduction loop [Nevins 1974]. These protocols are invoked
in particular types of situations, and frequently allow considerable
efficiency in performing standard patterns of action. Task networks
[Sacerdoti 1975, McDermott 1976] make an explicit representation of
past, present, and future program actions available to the program
itself. Thus task networks, like meta rules and protocols, allow the
direction of current and future reasoning to be influenced by the
program's knowledge about its own state of knowledge and past, present,
and future plans.
The Antecedent Embedding of Control
The view proposed here is that the view of these mechanisms as
controls on reasoning is best combined with the use of dependency
relationships among facts to implement these forms of control within
the framework of antecedent reasoning, and that this embedding of
control mechanisms alleviates many problems encountered in their
standard implementations.
One such problem affected by this embedding is the problem of
backtracking. In standard implementations, backtracking is usually
used in conjunction with consequent reasoning in a chronological
nnndpnels and_ Control on ov e_n oJ Doyl eDcaandsncfafi and antral
DencndcntcimI And tCnntrn1
fashion. Traditionally, backtracking is accomplished by rechoosing the
most recently made reversible choice, a process which normally requires
the consideration of many obviously irrelevant sets of choices. By
using dependency relationships, which when produced from the process of
antecedent reasoning are already free of Chronological dependencies,
the efficient method of dependency-directed backtracking of Stallman
and Sussman [1976] can be implemented. In this form of backtracking,
only those choices relevant to the current failure are considered for
change. In addition, recording of the demonstrably infeasible sets of
choices reduces future search considerably by ruling out any proposed
set of choices including any of the the known infeasible sets of
choices.
Consequent reasoning also benefits from being embedded in an
antecedent reasoning framework by being transformed into a non-
chronological process. Traditional implementations of consequent
reasoning have been chronological in nature. Because of this, the
effects of incomplete knowledge have been harder to deal with, in that
the chronological order of unsuccessful searches, assumptions, and
discoveries becomes significant. The wrong chronological orderings may
so induce an inconsistency in the program knowledge which, without
usefully recorded dependency information, is difficult to analyze and
remedy. Also, additional work is induced as successive queries about a
problem or about related problems normally have to perform the same
search effort as in the first query. This latter problem arises from
the difficulty of recording dependencies in a chronological system,
which forces searches to recompute previously derived, but discarded
information, so causing subsequent queries to require the duplication
of entire searches or subsearches. (Fikes [19751, however, has
proposed some mechanisms for alleviating these problems in a
chronological system. These mechanisms amount to some of the fragments
of the ARS dependency system which are easy to use in a chronological
system.)
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Seation 2. laots and Dependenoles
Each component of program knowledge is recognized as a distinct
entity called a fact. Facts are used in describing the dependency
relationships between the different components of program knowledge.
Belief in the truth of a particular fact may or may not be supported by
belief in the knowledge embodied in other facts. If a fact is known to
be true by virtue of its relationships with other facts, we say the
fact is in; otherwise the fact is out. The distinction between tin and
out is not the same as the distinction between true and false. To
represent the true/false dichotomy, each fact may have a negattye. The
negative of a fact represents the assertion which is true if and only
if the fact is false. The negative of a fact is a fact itself, and
also will be either in or out depending upon its support by other
facts. We define six predicates on facts which describe the possible
states of knowledge about the fact:
IN(f) af is tr
OUT(f) a , IN(f)
NEGIN(f) the negative.of f is tin
NEGOUT(J) (D NEGIN(f)
KNOWN() IN(f) v NEGIN(J)
UNKNOWN(f) -KNOWN (1).
Observe that IN, NEGIN, and UNKNOWN correspond to the classical
divisions of TRUE, FALSE, and UNKNOWN of 3-valued logic. It is
therefore a contradiction for both a fact and its negative to be in
simultaneously.
Each fact derives its support from its antecedent set. Each
antecedent in the antecedent set of a fact is a boolean function of the
above status predicates of other facts. A fact is in if one of its
antecedent functions is true, and is out otherwise. If a fact is in, a
single one of its antecedents may be designated as the fact's support;
the support of an out fact is the entire antecedent set of the fact.
Thus the status of a fact remains unchanged in new deductions if the
status of each of the facts in its support is unchanged.
This structure for the antecedents of a fact is a
generalization of the ARS dependency system [Stallman and Sussman
1976]. In this system, each antecedent in the antecedent set of a fact
corresponds to an alternate derivation of the fact. Some systems (such
as those of Fikes (1975] and McDermott [1976]) also record the support
dependencies of facts, but only record one derivation at a time. The
need to record all derivations was first realized in the ARS system, as
it was discovered that the single-antecedent scheme allowed the process
of backtracking to produce circularities in the support of facts.
Since ARS uses reasoning about the antecedents of a fact to control
search, this phenomenon required the introduction of antecedent sets
and "fact garbage collection."
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Antecedents in ARS are of a simple and monotonic nature, in
that the inning of a fact cannot (except in the case of contradictions)
cause the outing of other facts. Because of this monotonicity,
determination of the statuses of facts in ARS is accomplished by means
of two processes termed fact garbage collection and unouting. Fact
garbage collection occurs each time the status of a fact is changed
from tn to out, an occurrence typically due to the rechoosing of a
choice during backtracking. ARS's fact garbage collector examines each
fact to choose an antecedent which provides non-circular support for
the fact. unouting is the complementary process: when new support is
derived for an out fact, the fact's status is changed from out to in,
and all of its currently out consequences which then have support are
unouted recursively.
The generalized dependency system described above requires the
unification of fact garbage collection and unouting into a uniform
process called "truth maintenance." The possibility of the status of a
fact depending upon another fact being out makes the system of
dependencies non-monotonic. This non-monotonicity means that unouting
is no longer possible: whenever the support for a fact is changed,
truth maintenance must be performed to provide each fact with well-
founded support. However, truth maintenance need only be concerned
with those facts whose support may actually be affected by the
initially changed fact. Accordingly, this means that the process of
truth maintenance can be incremental. This realization shows that the
ARS system, which garbage collects all facts whenever any fact is
outed, is doing unnecessary work, and could be profitably changed to
use an incremental fact garbage collector.
In addition to requiring a unified truth maintenance system,
the dependency schema introduces new forms of inconsistencies which
must be recognizable. Three types of contradictions are recognizable
in general: explicit contradictions (facts which are known to
represent contradictions), contradictions arising from both a fact and
its negative having support and thus being considered in, and
unsatisfiable dependency relationships among facts. (An example of the
latter type of contradiction is a fact f whose antecedent set is
(OUT(f)). This antecedent set would force f to be ti if and only if it
was out - a contradiction.)
A necessary property of unsatisfiable dependencies is that they
must involve strong circularities in the dependency structure. (I use
the adjective "strong" here as these circularities are really just the
strongly connected components of the directed graph arising from the
natural interpretation of the dependency structure as a directed graph
on antecedent sets.) Par instance. in the above examnle of a fact f
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founded support for f cannot be chosen until well-founded support is
available for its antecedents, in this case f itself.
Not all strong circularities involve unsatisfiable dependency
relationships, however. Strong circularities arise naturally in
situations involving equalities and equivalences. In these situations
there is a natural solution to the problem: the status of one of the
facts is arbitrarily chosen to be out; this then determines the status
of the other facts involved in the circularity. Modifying this method,
however, are considerations due to the possibility of noncircular
dependencies between facts in distinct strongly connected components.
This possibility requires that the choices in distinct strong
circularities be consistent. Such consistent choices can be found by a
process of topologically sorting the strong circularities coupled with
backtracking. In such cases, inconsistencies are manifested as the
event of determining supposedly well-founded support for a fact with
arbitrarily chosen status, such that the newly determined status
differs from the chosen status. In this easily detectable event, one
of the choices involved in the inconsistency must be rechosen. If no
choice can be rechosen without creating another inconsistency, the
antecedent structure involved is determined to be unsatisfiable.
It should be pointed out that while the problem of finding a
satisfiable assignment of statuses to facts is NP-complete, and whose
solution by the above algorithm is potentially exponentially expensive,
all the known examples of such strong circularities are part of a
monotonic dependency relation, and thus are amenable to the method of
choosing of all involved facts to be out. Indeed, I have been unable
to construct a natural example in which unsatisfiable antecedent
structures occur, and so have not been worried by the potentially
expensive computations involved. The next section supports this
attitude by demonstrating the nature of several common dependency
structures, all of which are easily managable.
Typtcal Dependency Structures
This dependency scheme is sufficient to express many types of
dependency relationships. We give five simple examples of their use.
AND
If f represents AND(fl,...,fn), then f has an antecedent of the
form IN(f$,...,In). In addition, the negative of each ft has
an antecedent of the form IN(f1,...,ft-1, ft+,...,fn) A
NEG IN V).
(We extend the six status predicates above to predicates of
arbitrary sets of facts in the natural fashion by defining a
predicate on a set to be the conjunction of the predicate on
the elements.)
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OR
If f represents OR(f1,...,fn), then f has an antecedent of the
form IN(ft) for each ft. In addition, each ft has an
antecedent of the form NEGIN(fi,...,ft-i,f *i,...,jf) A IN(f).
XOR
If j1,...,fJ are mutually exclusive and exhaustive cases, then
the negative of each ft has an antecedent of the form IN(fJ)
for each Jot.
Ordered Choices
If jl,...,fn represent mutually exclusive choices, with a
preference for choosing ft over ft+l, then the following
relationships exist:
If has the antecedent NEGOUT(fI), and for t > 1,
ft has the antecedent NEGOUT(ft) A NEGIN(fl,...,ft-1).
PRESUMABLY
If I is to be assumed true unless it is provably false, J can
be given the antecedent NEGOUT(f).
The above example of the use of this dependency system to
describe the PRESUMABLY operator demonstrates the flexibility of this
system as compared with a simple 3-valued logic of TRUE, FALSE and
UNKNOWN. The concept of PRESUMABLY is considerably harder to describe
and maintain automatically in such systems.
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Seotion 8. Gonsequent Reasoning
For the purposes of efficient computation we distinguish each
component of a certain subset of the knowledge of a program as being of
a special type -f fact called a rule. Rules are not just static
knowledge, but have an imperative meaning attached to them. The basic
structure of antecedent rules is that of
<trigger> *• > <body>,
where <trigger> is a set of facts (named, of course, after Roy Rogers'
horse). The operation of the rule is such that when all of the facts
in the trigger are asserted, <body> is performed. (Or, as GLS
suggests, when th' trigger is pulled, the body is executed.)
A straightforward use of such rules in implementing consequent
reasoning is as follows. For simplicity, we describe only the case of
deduction. To effect a rule
R: A C'
in consequent fishion, an antecedent rule of the form
RI: IN((OPERATIONAL R)) A IN(A)
assert C with antecedent (AND (IN A) (IN R))
assert (SATISFIED (GOAL (DEDUCE C)))
with antecedent (AND (IN A) (IN R))
is asserted with antecedent (IN R), as is another antecedent rule of
the form
R2: IN((GOAL (DEDUCE C))) A
NEGIN((SATISFIED (GOAL (DEDUCE C))))
assert .(GOAL (DEDUCE A))
with antecedent
(AND (IN (GOAL (DEDUCE C))) (IN R)
(NEGIN (SATISFIED (GOAL (DEDUCE C)))))
assert (PRESUMABLY (NOT (SATISFIED (GOAL (DEDUCE A)))))
with antecedent
(AND (IN (GOAL (DEDUCE C))) (IN R)
(NEGIN (SATISFIED (GOAL (DEDUCE C)))))
assert (OPERATIONAL R)
with antecedent
(AND (IN (GOAL (DEDUCE C))) (IN R)
(NEGIN (SATISFIED (GOAL (DEDUCE C))))),
and finally, the fact
fl-n-ndrn,-a-irn nnrl (nntrnl- J-n Doyl
F: (PRESUMABLY (NOT (SATISFIED (GOAL (DEDUCE C)))))
is asserted with antecedent (IN R).
An Example
To demonstrate the operation of this method of consequent
reasoning, we present a simulation of the following familiar example in
detail. We leave out some computations which might occur but which do
not substantially affect the flavor of the process, and ignore a number
of questions raised by facts with variables in their statements and the




There is also a consequent rule,
F4: (HUMAN ?X) 2 (FALLIBLE ?X).
(As is usual, free "?" variables are assumed to be universally
quantified.) By the above process, F4 produces two antecedent rules,
Ri: IN( (OPERATIONAL F4) ) A IN( (HUMAN ?X) )
aL)
assert (FALLIBLE ,X)
with antecedent (AND (IN F4) (IN (HUMAN ,X)))
assert (SATISFIED (GOAL (DEDUCE (FALLIBLE ?X))))
with antecedent (AND (IN F4) (IN (HUMAN ,X)))
R2: IN( (GOAL (DEDUCE (FALLIBLE ?X))) ) A
NEGIN( (SATISFIED (GOAL (DEDUCE (FALLIBLE ?X)))) )
I=)>
assert (GOAL (DEDUCE (HUMAN ?X)))
with antecedent
(AND (IN (GOAL (DEDUCE (FALLIBLE ?X)))) (IN F4)
(NEGIN (SATISFIED (GOAL (DEDUCE (FALLIBLE ?X))))))
assert (PRESUMABLY
(NOT (SATISFIED (GOAL (DEDUCE (HUMAN ?X))))))
with antecedent.
(AND (IN (GOAL (DEDUCE (FALLIBLE ?X)))) (IN F.4)
(NEGIN (SATISFIED (GOAL (DEDUCE (FALLIBLE ?X))))))
assert (OPERATIONAL R1)
with antecedent
(AND (IN (GOAL (DEDUCE (FALLIBLE ?X)))) (IN F4)
(NEGIN
(SATISFIED (GOAL (DEDUCE (FALLIBLE ?X)))))).
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and the fact
PS: (PRESUMABLY
(NOT (SATISFIED (GOAL (DEDUCE (FALLIBLE ?X))))))
with antecedent (IN P4). (Here the "," prefix indicates a substitution
of the variable's value.) PS5 then triggers a rule for interpreting
PRESUMABLY, which asserts
F6: (NOT (SATISFIED (GOAL (DEDUCE (FALLIBLE ?X)))))
with antecedent (AND (IN FS) (NEGOUT F6)).
We now ask if there are any fallible Greeks.
P7: (QUERY (AND (FALLIBLE ?X) (GREEK ?X)))
This triggers a rule for handling queries by translating them into
goals with the appropriate antecedents. In this case, the rule asserts
F8: (PRESUMABLY
(NOT (SATISFIED
(GOAL (DEDUCE (AND (FALLIBLE ?X) (GREEK ?X))))))
with antecedent (IN F7), causing
F9: (NOT (SATISFIED
(GOAL (DEDUCE (AND (FALLIBLE ?X) (GREEK ?X))))))
to be asserted with antecedent (AND (IN F8) (NEGOUT F9)), then causes
PO1: (SATISFIED (GOAL (DEDUCE (AND (FALLIBLE ?X) (GREEK ?X)))))
to be asserted with no antecedents, and then asserts
Fli: (GOAL (DEDUCE (AND (FALLIBLE ?X) (GREEK ?X))))
with antecedent (AND (IN F7) (NEGIN F10)). F11 now triggers a rule for
reducing conjunctive goals to rules. This rule asserts the new rule
R3: IN( (FALLIBLE ?X) ) A IN( (GREEK ?X) ) A IN(F11)
assert (AND (FALLIBLE ,X) (GREEK ,X))
with antecedent
(AND (IN (FALLIBLE ,X)) (IN (GREEK ,X)))
assert (SATISFIED (GOAL (DEDUCE (AND (FALLIBLE ?X)
(GREEK ?X)))))
with antecedent
(AND (IN (FALLIBLE ,X)) (IN (GREEK ,X)))
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and asserts, or causes the assertion of
F12: (PRESUMABLY
(NOT (SATISFIED (GOAL (DEDUCE (FALLIBLE ?X))))))
with antecedent (IN F11)
P13: (PRESUMABLY
(NOT (SATISFIED (GOAL (DEDUCE (GREEK ?X))))))
with antecedent (IN F11)
F14: (NOT (SATISFIED (GOAL (DEDUCE (FALLIBLE ?X)))))
with antecedent (AND (IN F12) (NEGOUT P14))
P15: (SATISFIED (GOAL (DEDUCE (FALLIBLE ?X))))
with no antecedent
P16: (NOT (SATISFIED (GOAL (DEDUCE (GREEK ?X)))))
with antecedent (AND (IN P13) (NEGOUT P16))
P17: (SATISFIED (GOAL (DEDUCE (GREEK ?X))))
with no antecedent
P18: (GOAL (DEDUCE (FALLIBLE ?X)))
with antecedent (AND (IN F11) (NEGIN P1S))
P19: (GOAL (DEDUCE (GREEK ?X)))
with antecedent (AND (IN F11) (NEGIN P17)).
The new goal P18 now triggers R2. Since F14 is tn, R2 is fully
triggered, and asserts
F20: (GOAL (DEDUCE (HUMAN ?X)))
P21: (PRESUMABLY (NOT (SATISFIED (GOAL (DEDUCE (HUMAN ?X))))))
F22: (OPERATIONAL P4),
each with (AND (IN F18) (IN F4) (NEGIN F15)) as antecedent. R1 had
previously been triggered by P2 and P3, but could not proceed due to
the lack of P22. Now with F22 asserted, Ri asserts
P23: (FALLIBLE SOCRATES)
F24: (FALLIBLE TURING),
with the respective antecedents (AND (IN F2) (IN F4)) and (AND (IN F3)
(IN F4)). R3 is now fully triggered, and asserts
P15: (AND (FALLIBLE SOCRATES) (GREEK SOCRATES))
with antecedent (AND (IN F23) (IN Fl)). R3 also asserts FO10 with
antecedent (AND (IN F23) (IN Fl)), which changes the status of F11's
support, so that F11 is outed. But Fil supports the subgoals F18 and
p19, and F18 supports P20, and so these are outed also. Thus the query
is answered, the goals all outed, and the computation finished.
The primary features of this style of implementing consequent
reasoning are that:
Denen.ence ... ..Cont ____ _____Jon Dovyleeaendcncies and ontrol
Dependencies andCobtrol . 14. . Jon Doyle
(1) Goals exist only as long as some supergoal requires their
existence: the reo val of a goal removes all of the then unsupported
subgoals.
(2) The -.caoputations available in consequent rules are
performed only whe*n-a question exists making the computations relevant.
(3) Deact4vatlon of a rule does not invalidate any consequences
of the rule.
(4) If goal•iremain unsatisfied, they can later be satisfied by
the addition of new rules generating new facts and so allowing their
computations to ptoceed.
It should Ibe.-apparent, that in many applications a more refined
notion of goal .state is required than simply SATISFIED or NOT
SATISFIED. The remedy for this is to pass from simple goals to task
networks, and to use taxonomies of task states such as those defined in
McDermott's [1976] NASL system,. The exact form of such mechanisms is
still a topic of research.
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Seotion 4. Disoussion
Relatton to Other Research
Until the BUILD program of Fahlman [1974], the dominant
paradigm embodied in problem-solving programs was that of the MICRO-
PLANNER language [Sussman, Winograd and Charniak 19711, a simplified
version of the PLANNER language developed by Hewitt [19721. The
problem-solving style captured in MICRO-PLANNER is the style of most
problem-solving systems constructed up to its time: heuristic search
of AND-OR goal trees constructed by a collection of antecedent and
consequent pattern-invoked programs driven by an automatic
chronological backtracking control structure. (See Winston [19761 for
discussions of these techniques.) In this style of problem solving,
embodied in programs like GPS [Ernst and Newell 19691, SAINT [Slagle
19631, Gelernter's [1963] Geometry-Theorem proving machine, Black's
[19681 question answerer, STRIPS [Fikes and Nilsson 19711, SHRDLU[Winograd 19721, and Goldstein's [1973] geometry theorem prover, search
through different branches of the goal tree have essentially no
influence on each other. The major forms of information communicated
between subgoals, if any, usually amounted to signals of failure (for
instance, the MICRO-PLANNER FAIL command) or indications of high
expected difficulty (as in GPS and SAINT).
A competing problem-solving paradigm of the time was that
embodied in resolution theorem provers such as QA3 [Green 1969], a
paradigm formalizing the effectively non-deterministic qualities of the
MICRO-PLANNER approach.. In these systems, all formulas following from
the problem model could theoretically be used once derived. This
channel of communication between attempts was usually limited in
practice as theorem provers turned to various restricted resolution
schemes [Chang and Lee 19731 constraining the use of formulas in
resolutions as a method for gaining efficiency, often resulting in the
derivation of formulas which could not be used at any point of the
solution. In addition, these systems suffered from monotonicity
problems [Minsky 1974], as the theorem provers were unable to conclude
any results from their inability to derive a formula, and could not
decide to remove a proven formula from their set of formulas (although
occasionally new axioms could be checked for consistency [Green 19691).
In particular, these theorem provers had no way to make assumptions
based on their inability to prove a certain formula. These limitations
were primarily due to an enforcement of completeness and consistency at
each step. As we have seen, by using dependency relationships between
facts it is possible to maintain consistency even in the presence of
assumptions.
The first effort to break away from the MICRO-PLANNER problem-
solving paradigm was the BUILD program of Fahlman [1974]. This program
used analysis of its own goal structure to correct its mistakes and
maneuver out of blind alleys. The techniques of reasoning about
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relationships involving the reasons for goals and plan steps were then
further developed in HACKER [Sussman 1975], MYCROFT [Goldstein 1974],
and NOAH (Sacerdoti 1975). These programs demonstrated certain
information which, if recorded during the problem solving process,
allowed simple algorithms for the detection and correction of a number
of mistakes arising from the use of simple planning heuristics. Fikes
and Nilsson [1971] and Waldinger [1975] also present representations
for plan steps which allow the construction of new plans from old ones
by reasoning about relationships among the old plan steps.
Analysis of the reasoning involved in the construction of plans
facilitates the processes of replanning and execution monitoring. This
type of reasoning is used to good advantage in the work of Hayes
[1975], who presents an explicit representation for some of the
reasoning involved in planning, and uses this information in replanning
upon discovering obstructing changes in the world. Similar information
is made explicit in NASL [McDermott 1976]. NOAH also retains a complex
representation of the structure of a plan which is modified and
interrogated to check plan execution progress and to replan from
mistakes. STRIPS and PLANEX rFikes and Nilsson 1971] also use a
complex representation of the structure of plans in execution
monitoring and replanning, but this representation is less informative
and thus less powerful than the representation employed by NOAH.
Although STRIPS and NOAH maintain a record of plan structure, unlike
Hayes' system and NASL they do not also represent explicitly the
reasoning involved in creating the plans and thus require different and
more extensive analyses of the plans to modify them. It is interesting
to compare these approaches to those of BUILD and HACKER, which both
plan by a process of continual simulated execution monitoring and
replanning. HACKER, however, represents little more than a program for
the plan itself explicitly, forcing it to do a considerable amount of
analysis to discover the nature of its errors. BUILD represents even
less information explicitly, and relies on the "hairy control
structure" of CONNIVER [McDermott and Sussman 1972] to control the
analysis and correction of errors.
Reasoning about the reasoning involved in the design and
internal structure of plans, devices or beliefs plays a great role in
current work on failure localization and debugging. These problems
have been or are being investigated in the contexts of reconciling
beliefs, debugging knowledge bases, troubleshooting electronic
circuits, and constructing, explaining and debugging computer programs.
TOPLE [McDermott 1974] reconciles its conflicting beliefs by making
assumptions based on the nature of the conflict, and later analyzes the
relationships it has assumed if it finds cause to doubt the truth of a
related fact. MYCIN [Shortliffe 1975, Davis 1976] employs a system of
dependencies among its beliefs, goals and rules which admits thorough
explanations of reasons for program behavior to a human expert adding
to or locating deficiencies in the program knowledge base. WATSON
[Brown and Sussman 1974, Brown 1974, 1975] uses knowledge of the
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teleology of circuits (knowledge of the reasoning behind the design of
the circuits) to localize failures of circuits to the failure of
specific circuit components. INTER Ede Kleer 1976b) also localizes
failures in electronic circuits, but reasons about the relationships
among its assumptions about component behavior to determine component
failures, rather than relying on knowledge of the teleology of
circuits.
Analysis of program assumptions and their relation to other
program knowledge has recently seen substantial application in the
dependency-directed backtracking scheme developed in ARS. Another
backtracking scheme which analyzes the relations between the choices
involved in a failure is used in the graphical deduction system of Cox
and Pietrzykowski [1976]. Latombe [1976] employs reasoning about
dependencies in choosing choice points for backtracking purposes, but
does not explicitly describe the exact mechanisms used.
Analysis of past and present reasoning can also be used in the
control of current and future reasoning. The MYCIN system employs a
hierarchy of meta-rules for this purpose. In this system of production
rules, a first level of meta-rules is used to control the application
of the regular production rules. Successive levels of meta-rules are
each used to control the application of meta-rules at the next lower
level. In this way strategies, hints for choosing strategies, and
higher level control information may be encoded. (In actuality, MYCIN
at present contains only first level meta-rules. Although its
implementation permits higher level meta-rules to be used, none have
been formalized to date. In addition, the form of rules and meta rules
used in MYCIN is very restricted, which simplifies the processes of
explanation and acquisition, but limits the flexibility of the system.)
In addition to controlling the current reasoning tasks, the NASL system
provides elegant tools for interpreting the current state of reasoning
and for specifying both future tasks. and continuing policies for
controlling task execution. NASL embodies taxonomies for the
description of partially ordered task networks, providing semantics for
a generalization and extension of Sacerdoti's [1975] procedural nets.
(See, for example, the implementation of a NOAH-like Blocks World
planner in NASL [McDermott 1976, Doyle and McDermott, forthcoming].)
As well as specifying the semantics of task networks, NASL provides
basic. tools for modifying the task network and the the relationships
among tasks in several ways.
Reasoning about past reasoning and careful recording and use of
dependency relationships among facts also work together to aid problem-
solving in worlds with influential actions. Classic approaches to this
problem have included specifying frame axioms for all actions and
conditions [McCarthy and Hayes 1969, Raphael 1971], specifying add and
delete lists for operators [Fikes and Nilsson 1971], embedding add and
delete lists in simulating procedures [Fahlman 1974, Sussman 1975],
distinguishing between primary and secondary knowledge [Fahlman 1974,
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change-observers IRieger 1976•. Automatically maintained dependency
relationships amgng facts work smoothly with most of these approaches,
providing easy a4ess to. possibly invalidated knowledge to a program
confronted with. cqontradictions, and a simple system for updating the
program knowledge upon recognizing change. Such mechanisms would seem
to allow consider ably easier access to suspicious assumptions than
other representations of world states, such as those of Waldinger
[19751, Kowalski *l 19?31.j Warren [19741, Hewitt [1975], and Sacerdoti
[19753.
In additkon to their uses in reasoning about influential
actions, dependency records resulting from the reasoning process can
also be used, to easily work with hypothetical worlds. A dependency
based context schgame, such as that employed in ARS provides a
convenient channel by which reasoning in distinct hypothetical worlds
can interact and:. supplement the general body of knowledge. Facts
derived while iivestigating a hypothetical world may also be valid in
the non-hypothetical world, and thus will not be lost if the hypotheses
are abandoned. In addition, the consistent merging of two distinct
contexts becomes a trivial (and invisible) operation, as opposed to the
difficulties it enttils in CONNIVER-type context mechanisms for
hypothetical reasoning [Waldinger 19754, McDermott 1975].
Appropriately recorded dependency information also simplifies
the construction of articulate, self-explaining experts. SHRDLU
[Winograd 19.72] answers certain types of questions by examining
relationships between, past and present goals and subgoals. NOAH uses
similar inforuationto answer questions about purposes and methods.
MYCIN analyzes recorded dependency relationships to produce
explanations of its reasoning, 4 feature significantly aiding in the
processes of reassuring human experts and detecting and correcting
knowledge base errors and deficiencies. The EL-ARS system provides a
similar power of explanation, but makes no attempt to give its
explanations in English.
Conclusions
Non-chronological dependency relationships can be easily
recorded in an antecedent reasoning framework. These dependency
relationships can be used in many ways; for explanation, as a means
towards maintaining consistency in a database, and most importantly, as
tool to use in the. control of the reasoning process. In particular,
such dependency relationships can be used to effect the efficient
control method of: dependency-directed backtracking, and can be used to
implement non-chronological consequent reasoning in an antecedent
reasoning framework,




The content of this work has improved through advice from and
discussions with Johan de Kleer, Scott Fahlman, Ben Kuipers, Richard
Stallman, Guy L. Steele Jr., Gerald Jay Sussman, Tomas Lozano-Perez,
and Kurt Van Lehn. Guy Steele also provided editorial help. This
research is supported by a Fannie and John Hertz graduate fellowship.
nanan· mb.o-i e And .  . ... Y1·· Y v
-- r----------- ---- -------- -- ---- -----
Dependencie a d ConJon Dovlt
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[Black 1968]
Fischer Black, "A Deductive Question Answering System," in Minsky,
Semantic Information Proceasstg, pp. 354-402.
[Brown 1974]
Allen L. Brown, "Qualitative Knowledge, Causal Reasoning, and the
Localization of Failures," MIT AI Lab, Working Paper 61,
March 1974.
[Brown 1975]
Allen Brown, "Qualitative Knowledge, Causal Reasoning, and the
Localization of Failures," MIT EECS Ph.D. Thesis, 1975.
[Brown and Sussman 1974]
Allen L. Brown and Gerald Jay Sussman, "Localization of Failures in
Radio Circuits: A Study in Causal and Teleological
Reasoning," MIT AI Lab, AT Memo 319, December 1974.
[Chang and Lee 1973]
Chin-Liang Chang and Richard Char-Tung Lee, Symbolic Logic and
Mechanical Theorem Proving, Academic Press, New York, 1973.
[Cox and Pietrzykowski 1976]
Philip T. Cox and T. Pietrzykowski, "A Graphical Deduction System,"
Department of Computer Science Research Report CS-75-35,
University of Waterloo, July 1976.
[Davis 1976]
Randall Davis, "Applications of Meta Level Knowledge to the
Construction, maintenance and Use of Large Knowledge Bases,"
Stanford Al Lab Memo AIM-283, July 1976.
[de Kleer 1976a]
Johan de Kleer, "Domain Specific Control of Search in Predicate-
Calculus Theorem Provers," informal draft, MIT Al Lab, April
26, 1976.
[de Kleer 1976b]
Johan de Kleer, "Local Methods for Localization of Faults in Electronic
Circuits," MIT AI Lab Working Paper 109, August, 1976.
[Dijkstra 1976]
Edsger W. Dijkstra, A Discipline of Programming, Prentice-Hall,






Jon Doyle, "Analysis by Propagation of Constraints in Elementary
Geometry Problem Solving," MIT AI Lab, WP 108, June 1976.
[Ernst and Newell 1969]
George W. Ernst and Allen Newell, GPS, A Case Study in Generality and
Problem-Soletng, Academic Press, New York, 1969.
[Fahlaan 1974]
Scott E. Fahlman, "A Planning System for Robot Construction Tasks,"
Artifictal Iatelitgence, 6 (1974), pp. 1-49.
[Pikes 19753
Richard E. Pikes, "Deductive Retrieval Mechanisms for State Description
Models," IJCAI4, September 1975, pp. 99-106.
[Pikes and Nilsson 1971]
R. E. Pikes and N. J. Nilsson, "STRIPS: A New Approach to the
Application of Theorem Proving to Problem Solving,"
Artifitctal Intelligence 2, (1971), pp. 189-208.
[Fikes, Hart and Nilsson 1972]
Richard E. Pikes, Peter E. Hart, and Nils J. Nilsson, "Learning and
Executing Generalized Robot Plans," Arttificial Intelligence 8,
(Winter 1972) pp. 251-288.
[Gelernter 1963]
H. Gelernter, "Realization of a Geometry-Theorem Proving Machine," in
Feigenbaum and Feldman, Computers and Thought, pp. 134-152.
[Goldstein 1973]
Ira Goldstein, "Elementary Geometry Theorem Proving," MIT AI Lab, Al
Memo 280, April 1973.
[Goldstein 1974]
Ira P. Goldstein, "Understanding Simple Picture Programs," MIT Al Lab,
TR-294, September 1974.
[Goldstein and Miller 1976]
Ira P. Goldstein and Mark L. Miller, "Structured Planning and
Debugging: a Linguistic Approach to Problem Solving," MIT AI
Lab, Working Paper 125, June 1976.
[Green 1969]
C. Cordell Green, "Theorem-Proving by Resolution as a Basis for
Question-Answering Systems," in Meltzer and Michie, Machtne
Intelitgence 4, pp. 183-205.
Denendencls and Co nt Jo Dvlncacndencias and ontrol n oJ orl e
Deoendencies and Control Jon Doyle
[Hayes 1975]
Philip J. Hayes, "A Representation for Robot Plans," IJCAI4, September
1975, pp. 181-188.
[Hewitt 19721
Carl E. Hewitt, "Description and Theoretical Analysis (Using Schemata)
of PLANNER: A Language for Proving Theorems and Manipulating
Models in a Robot," MIT AI Lab, TR-258, April 1972.
[Hewitt 1975]
Carl Hewitt, "How to Use What You Know," IJCAI4, September 1975, pp.
189-198.
[Kowalski 1973]
Robert Kowalski, "Predicate Logic as a Programming Language,"
University of Edinburgh, Department of Computational Logic,
DCL Memo 70, 1973.
[Latombe 1976]
Jean-Claude Latombe, "Artificial Intelligence in Computer-Aided Design:
The TROPIC System," SRI AI Center, TN-125, February 1976.
[McCarthy and Hayes 1969]
J. McCarthy and P. J. Hayes, "Some Philosophical Problems from the
Standpoint of Artificial Intelligence," in Meltzer and
Michie, Machine Intelligence 4, pp. 463-502.
[McDermott 1974]
Drew Vincent McDermott, "Assimilation of New Information by a Natural
Language-Understanding System," MIT AI Lab, AI-TR-291,
February 1974.
[McDermott 1975]
Drew V. McDermott, "Very Large PLANNER-type Data Bases," MIT Al Lab, AI
Memo 339, September 1975.
[McDermott 19761
Drew Vincent McDermott, "Flexibility and Efficiency in a Computer
Program for Designing Circuits," MIT EECS Ph.D. Thesis,
September 1976.
[McDermott and Sussman 1974]
Drew V. McDermott and Gerald Jay Sussman, "The CONNIVER Reference
Manual," MIT AI Lab, Al Memo 259a, January 1974.
[Minsky 1974]
Marvin Minsky, "A Framework for Representing Knowledge," MIT AI Lab, AI
Memo 306, June 1974.
Deoendencies and Control Jon Dovyle
Depedences ad CotrolJon oyl
[Moore 1975]
Robert Carter Moore, "Reasoning From Incomplete Knowledge in a
Procedural Deduction System," MIT Al Lab, AI-TR-347, December
1975.
[Nevins 1974]
Arthur J. Nevins, "Plane Geometry Theorem Proving Using Forward
Chaining," MIT Al Lab Memo 303, January 1974.
[Raphael 1971]
B. Raphael, "The Frame Problem in Problem Solving Systems," in
Artificial Intelligence and leurtistc Programmtng, pp. 159-
169, (eds. N. V. Findler and B. Meltzer) Edinburgh
University Press, 1971.
[Rieger 1975]
Chuck Rieger, "One System for Two Tasks: A Commonsense Algorithm
Memory that Solves Problems and Comprehends Language," MIT AI
Laboratory, Working Paper 114, November 1975.
[Rieger 1976]
Chuck Rieger, "Spontaneous Computation in Cognitive Models," Department
of Computer Science TR-459, University of Maryland, July
1976.
[Robinson 1965]
J. A. Robinson, "A Machine-Oriented Logic Based on the Resolution
Principle," JACR, 12 (January 1965), pp. 23-41.
[Sacerdoti 1975]
Earl D. Sacerdoti, "A Structure for Plans and Behavior," SRI AI Center,
TN 109, August 1975.
[Shortliffe 1976]
E. H. Shortliffe, NYCII, Computer-Based Nedtcal Computations, American
Elsevier, 1976.
[Slagle 1963]
James R. Slagle, "A Heuristic Program that Solves Symbolic Integration
Problems in Freshman Calculus," in Feigenbaum and Feldman,
Computers and Thought, pp. 191-203.
[5Stallman and Sussman 1976]
Richard M. Stallman and Gerald Jay Sussman, "Forward Reasoning and
Dependency-Directed Backtracking in a System for Computer-
Aided Circuit Analysis," MIT AI Memo 380, September 1976.
[Sussman 1975]
Gerald Jay Sussman, A Computer Nodel of Skill Acqutsition, American
Elsevier Publishing Company, New York, 1975.
Dependencies and Control Jon Doyle
ne and Coto _ __.__ ·_____Jon Dovle
[Sussman and McDermott 1972]
Gerald Jay Sussman and Drew Vincent McDermott, "From PLANNER to
CONNIVER - A genetic approach," Proc. AFIPS FJCC, 1972, pp.
1171-1179.
(Sussman and Stallman 1975]
Gerald Jay Sussman and Richard Matthew Stallman, "Heuristic Techniques
in Computer-Aided Circuit Analysis," IEEE Transactions on
Circutts and Sgstems, Vol. CAS-22, No. 11, November 1975,
pp. 857-865.
[Sussman, Winograd and Charniak 1971]
Gerald Jay Sussman, Terry Winograd and Eugene Charniak, "MICRO-PLANNER
Reference Manual," MIT Al Lab, Al Memo 203a, December 1971.
[Waldinger 1975]
Richard Waldinger, "Achieving Several Goals Simultaneously," SRI AI
Center, Technical Note 107, July 1975,
[Warren 1974]
David H. D. Warren, "WARPLAN: A System for Generating Plans,"
University of Edinburgh, Department of Computational Logic
Memo No. 76, June 1974.
[Winograd 1972]
Terry Winograd, Understanding Natural Language, Academic Press, New
York, 1972.
(Winston 1976]
Patrick Henry Winston, Artificial Intelligence, MIT Artificial
Intelligence Laboratory, September, 1976.
Dependencies and Control
n 
oJ Doyl 
e
